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Abstract
Engulfed in a constant ideological challenge from various societal organizations, Indonesia inflicts an
ideological curtailment measure as an attempt to defend the reign of its state ideology, Pancasila. To this
end, a societal organization is barred from actively adopting, developing, and spreading any teaching or
idea which contradicts Pancasila. From an international law standpoint, assertion over the measure’s
incompatibility with human rights norms emerges. Although a portion of the justification conveyed by the
Government of Indonesia did stipulate a reference to the international human rights law regime by invoking
a state of emergency and a presumably regional norm, such defense is shaky at best when being confronted
with the temporal nature of the state of emergency and the high threshold to ascertain a regional customary
international law. This Article, therefore, proposes an alternative defense for such curtailment measures
from an international law perspective. In doing so, this Article will first delve to pinpoint the ideological issue
within the corpus of international law. Subsequently, by navigating through international conventions and
jurisprudences, it will establish conceivable justifications for Indonesia’s ideological curtailment. Finally,
this Article will also observe the looming challenges and opportunities as Indonesia embraces a restrictive
approach for societal organizations existing under its jurisdiction.
Keywords: Pancasila, ideological curtailment, societal organization, freedom of expression, human rights
Abstrak
Dilanda tantangan ideologis dari berbagai organisasi kemasyarakatan secara terus menerus, Indonesia
menerapkan langkah pembatasan ideologi sebagai salah satu cara mempertahankan supremasi ideologi
negara, Pancasila. Dalam hal ini, organisasi kemasyarakatan dilarang untuk secara aktif menganut,
mengembangkan, serta menyebarkan ajaran atau paham yang bertentangan dengan Pancasila. Dari
perspektif hukum internasional, argumentasi terkait ketidaksesuaian larangan tersebut dengan norma hak
asasi manusia pun mengemuka. Meskipun justifikasi dari Pemerintah Indonesia turut merujuk pada rezim
hukum hak asasi manusia international melalui penggunaan konsep keadaan darurat dan norma regional
yang diasumsikan telah terbentuk, argumen tersebut goyah bila dihadapkan dengan karakteristik temporer
dari keadaan darurat dan parameter yang tinggi untuk memastikan sudah terbentuknya hukum kebiasaan
internasional di tingkat regional. Artikel ini oleh karenanya, menawarkan argumentasi pembelaan altenatif
terkait langkah pembatasan tersebut dari perspektif hukum internasional. Terkait hal tersebut, Artikel
ini pertama akan memetakan letak isu ideologi dalam kerangka hukum internasional. Kemudian, dengan
menelusuri pelbagai konvensi dan putusan internasional, Artikel ini akan menjabarkan justifikasi terkait
pembatasan ideologi di Indonesia. Terakhir, Artikel ini juga akan mencermati tantangan dan kesempatan
yang ada dari pendekatan restriktif yang diambil Indonesia terhadap organisasi kemasyarakatan yang
berada di bawah yurisdiksi Indonesia.
Kata kunci: Pancasila, pembatasan ideologi, organisasi kemasyarakatan, kebebasan berekspresi, hak asasi
manusia
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I. Introduction

In 2017, confronted with a snowballing ideological challenge in the form of
myriad activities from several societal organizations, President Joko Widodo issued
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2017 regarding the Amendment
of Law Number 17 of 2013 regarding Societal Organization, which was then formally
upheld and transformed into Law by the House of Representatives through Law
Number 16 of 2017 (hereinafter referred to as Societal Organization Law or “SOL”).1
Substantially, SOL governs the prohibition for a societal organization to adopt,
develop, and spread the teaching or idea which contradicts Pancasila, or the state
ideology.2 Chronologically in Indonesia, it is not foreign for the state to intervene
and by extension, to curtail the ideological framework of societal organization as
articulated in SOL.3 Substantially, the formulation of SOL introduces an expansion
from the initial limitation governed under the previous relevant Law, wherein the
scope of the curtailed ideas was notably exhaustive.4
Table 1. Curtailed Ideology in Indonesia

Law Number 17 of 2013
Atheism

Communism

Marxism-Leninism

SOL

Atheism

Communism

Marxism-Leninism

Other ideas with the intent of
replacing/altering Pancasila and the
1945 Constitution

From an international law standpoint, such curtailment is prone to be scrutinized
due to its close nexus with the international human rights law regime as enumerated
within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which traverses
several rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom
of thought and conscience.5 Aware of such apprehension, from an international law
perspective, two main justifications were conveyed by the government in issuing SOL,
ergo limiting the scope of ideological framework to a societal organization.
First, the government invoked the application of Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, which
stipulates that “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant
may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures

1
Natively known as Law regarding “Organisasi Kemasyarakatan”, interchangeably, several English interpretations of this term include “Mass Organization”, “Civil Society Organization”, and “Societal Organization”. In this paper, “Societal Organization” will be used in referring to such a term.
2
SOL, Art 59(4)c.
3
See inter alia Decision of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly Number XXV/MPRS/1966
of 1966, Art 2 and Art 3, and Law Number 17 of 2013, Art 2 and Art 59(4).
4
As stipulated within the Elucidation of Art 59(4) of Law Number 17 of 2013, the preceding regulatory framework governing societal organization before SOL, the curtailed ideas exhaustively comprise
Atheism, Communism/Marxism-Leninism.
5
See 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, Art 18; Art 19 and Art
22.
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are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or
social origin.”6

The government argued that the relentless activities of certain societal
organizations which incited hatred through various means and purposefully
deviated their adherence from state ideology had in essence brought Indonesia to
the proclaimed state of public emergency within the ambit of the said article as chaos
in the society was viable.7 In this defense, one may argue that there exists a latent
incompatibility pertaining to the temporal scope of the provisions within the two
legal instruments. The invocation of Article 4(1) of the ICCPR is subject to a variety
of procedural thresholds, including the temporal limitation of its applicability or its
duration.8 On the contrary, SOL is permanent in nature as it serves as the umbrella
rule governing the general conduct of societal organizations in Indonesia. Thus,
even after a specific societal organization that allegedly violated the curtailment as
inscribed within SOL is dully sanctioned or even legally dissolved, SOL endures to be
binding towards other societal organizations.

Second, by invoking the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights which
stipulates that “…while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered
in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing
in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds…” the government also asserted a regional
norm as developed within members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in perceiving the universal scope of human rights obligation.9 Accordingly,
the government appealed to the regional norm which arguably had crystallized
in Southeast Asia. On this argument, one may negate that such norms as reflected
within the 1993 Bangkok Declaration may very well be solely a reflection of soft law,
thus bears no binding legal force, unlike any regional human rights convention in
other areas.10 Further, even if such declaration wanted to be treated as a regional or
particular customary international law, per Asylum Case, the burden of proof to do so
is notoriously strict, thus warrants further exposition, in particular, relating to the
uniform usage of such a norm within the region, which is absent if one refers to the
elucidation of SOL.11
Responding to these critical assessments, this Paper, therefore, is intended
to stipulate an alternative defense to complement the existing international law
argument as elaborated within the elucidation of SOL. In doing so, it will delve to
scrutinize legitimate grounds to limit freedom of expression from Article 19 of the
ICCPR to justify Indonesia’s permanent nature of ideological limitation to a societal

SOL, Elucidation.
SOL, Elucidation.
8
See UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, General Comment on Article 4 (2001): para 4 and para 17.
9
SOL, Elucidation.
10
See the discussion on the definition of soft law where formal written documents signed by states
but do not satisfy the benchmark of a treaty may also be classified as a soft law in Andrew T. Guzman &
Timothy L. Meyer, “International Soft Law,” Journal of Legal Analysis 2, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 172-174. See
also as a comparison inter alia Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, ETS 5 (4 November 1950), and Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San Jose”, Costa Rica,
(22 November 1969).
11
See International Court of Justice, “Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case,” (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment
of November 20th, 1950, I.C.J. Rep. 1950 p.266 (1950): 276-277, and also SOL, Elucidation.
6
7

Volume 12 Number 2, May - August 2022 ~ INDONESIA Law Review

Sanctioning Ideas: Alternative International Law Argument

~ 21 ~

organization and elaborate practices where freedom of expression, including
on certain ideology is restricted in jurisdictions beyond ASEAN states to further
demonstrate that such practice is not exclusive to the ASEAN states and drives
beyond the regionality paradigm, rather than aiming to establish that such a norm
had crystallized into a regional or particular customary international law.

The methodology used by this Paper will fall under the doctrinal research category,
which seeks to understand what the law is in a particular area.12 It will rely on sources
of international law which include international conventions, international custom,
general principles of law, judicial decisions, and teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists as primary sources.13 The structure of this Paper will be mainly divided
into three parts. The first part will elucidate the understanding of state ideology
through international jurisprudence and assess its nature within the confines of the
sovereignty concept in international law. Going further, by observing international
conventions and practices in several jurisdictions, the second part of this Paper
will impart possible justifications for Indonesia’s current ideological curtailment
of societal organization. Finally, the third part of this Paper will scrutinize current
challenges and opportunities within Indonesia’s existing regulatory framework in
limiting certain ideologies to be adopted by a societal organization.

II. Legal Pluralism and the Impenetrable Nature of State Ideology by International Law: Indonesia’s Context
A. An International Law Perspective on State Ideology

To comprehend the position of international law on state ideology, one needs to
first identify the elements which form the characterization of an ideology. Hamilton
defined ideology as “a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual
ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships
and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which
its proponents seek to promote, realize, pursue or maintain.”14 Additionally, McClosky
noted that ideology manifests as “systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and
coherent, that justify the exercise of power, explain and judge historical events, identify
political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections (causal and moral) between
politics and other spheres of activity.”15 Dissecting the aforementioned definitions and
applying them to the Westphalian concept, one can deduce that ideology relates to a
state’s perspective to identify its innate virtue, history, as well as its future ideals and
the means to get there. Inevitably, the spectrum of ideology would vary from one state
to another as each state has its own experience and comprehension of values and
objectives that it wished to achieve as it was initially formed as a nation-state. To this
end, one question worth to be discussed is whether such a realm may be meddled by
international law.
To examine the answer to such a question, it is pertinent to first observe the
relationship between international law with domestic law. Over the course of its
history, international law has been functioning as a force to converge certain norms

12
Mike McConville; Wing Hong Chui (eds.), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 21.
13
1945 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179, Art 38.
14
John Gerring, “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December
1997): 959.
15
Gerring, Ideology: A Definitional…, 958.
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into one global order and further penetrate a state’s national legal system. Take human
rights law as a corpus of international law, for instance, the process to consolidate
its norms in international legal instruments and subsequently influencing a state’s
national regulatory framework has been apparent, transformative, and effective.
Chronologically, Beth Simmons opines that. the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) has been widely noted as a crucial milestone in forming the
international rights legal regime.16 Such claim is profoundly substantial as following
the adoption of the UDHR, multiple binding conventions were adopted and ratified by
the majority of states.17 This includes the ICCPR which as of this moment, is binding
to 173 states.18 Branching wider, the consolidated force of human rights law even
goes beyond a treaty obligation, as observed by Robbins, some of the rights enshrined
within the sphere of international human rights law have crystallized into customary
international law.19 The sheer magnitude of its influence at the international level
even trenches deeper to the domestic level as it inspires the formulation of human
rights-related provisions in various national constitutions.20

Notwithstanding the generally intrusive nature of international law towards the
state’s legal system as previously illustrated in the human rights area, certain aspects
remain impenetrable and reserved ultimately as part of the state’s sovereignty. Such
paradigm follows the school of legal pluralism wherein a degree of fragmentation and
diversity within the national legal system of varying states is preserved as opposed to
forcing the world to be governed under one order.21 Reverting to the initial question
on ideology, does it stand as one of the aspects that international law aims to converge
and subsequently meddle in the national level or is it categorized within the auspice
of legal pluralism, therefore subject to the state’s sovereignty?

Respectively, it is worth noting that in Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) edicts that a state’s freedom in choosing its political, social, economic, and
cultural system is the very essence of sovereignty on which the whole international
law rests.22 Such diverse values and traditions are the foundation for each state’s
legal system, hence forming its respective sovereignty under international law.
To this end, inseparable from the discussion on the state’s political system, ICJ
subsequently notes that the state’s choice in adhering to certain ideology falls outside
the assertion of international law.23 It further postulates that a state’s subscription
to any doctrine therefore cannot be equated as a breach of customary international
law.24 Axiomatically, ICJ further solidifies its stance by noting that within the ambit of

16
Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42.
17
See for example the reference to the UDHR in the preambles of the ICCPR; and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3.
18
United Nations Treaty Collection, “Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” accessed May 28, 2022, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_
en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND.
19
Melissa Robbins, “Powerful States, Customary Law and the Erosion of Human Rights through Regional Enforcement,” California Western International Law Journal 35, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 281.
20
Hurst Hannum, “The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law,” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 25, no. Issues 1 & 2 (1995/1996): 289.
21
David Kennedy, “One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan Dream,”
New York University Review of Law & Social Change 31, no. 3 (2007): 641-646.
22
Kennedy, One, Two…,641-646.
23
International Court of Justice, “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.” (Nicaragua v. the United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Rep. 14 (1986): 109, para. 207.
Nicaragua para 207
24
International Court of Justice, 133, para 263.
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the Charter of the United Nations as expounded by General Assembly resolution 2625
(XXV), the coexistence of states with their various ideologies lies at the heart of the
established principle of non-intervention.25

The premise that the ICJ has established in Nicaragua pertaining to the state’s
ideological matter, therefore, indicates a clear demarcation between the state’s
sovereignty and certain invasive facets of international law. The ruling is of high
pertinence from an international law perspective as it sets the precedent where
the state is under free rein in ascertaining any ideology it wishes to instill within its
jurisdiction. This notion is no exception to Indonesia and the state ideology it adopts,
which for better or worse, subsequently dictates the manner in which it governs the
ideological framework for every societal organization falling under its jurisdiction.
B. Ideological Framework in Indonesia and its Limitation on Societal Organization

As previously discussed, per Nicaragua, international law paves the way for a
state’s freedom in adhering to a certain ideology as it lies within the auspice of a state’s
sovereignty. To this effect, Indonesia subscribes to Pancasila as its state ideology. The
term encompasses five principles that are encapsulated within the Preamble of the
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.26 These principles are: “Belief in One
Almighty God.” “Humanitarianism, Righteous and Civilized,” “Unity of Indonesia,” and
“Democracy Guided by Wisdom in the Consultations of Representatives,” together with
the realization of “Social justice for all the people of Indonesia.”27

Tracing the early process which transpired in Indonesia to adopt Pancasila as
the state ideology, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara noted that the codification of Pancasila
can be found initially in the speeches preceding the establishment of the 1945
Constitution, specifically in the speech of Indonesia’s First President, Soekarno, on
June 1, 1945.28 Prawiranegara further observed that Soekarno particularised Pancasila
as the “philosofische grondslag” of Indonesian independence which envisages “the
foundation, philosophy, the most profound thought, the spirit, and the deepest desire,
upon which to build the eternal, indestructible mansion of Independent Indonesia.”29
Concerning said historical perspective, from a geopolitical context, Pancasila stands
as a distinguishing ideology that goes beyond the traditional classification of the
20th-century dominant political ideologies, which comprise liberalism, communism,
and fascism.30
In a more contemporary context, from the legislation-making standpoint, serving
as the foundation and ideology of the state, Pancasila constitutes the ultimate source
of all sources of state laws.31 Accordingly, every substantive element within any
legislation must adhere to the philosophies and values enshrined within Pancasila and
may not contradict them.32 Conforming to such a line of effect, SOL, as the regulatory
framework governing societal organization obliges societal organization with two

International Court of Justice, para 264.
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Pancasila as the Sole Foundation,” Indonesia, no. 38 (1984): 77.
27
Prawiranegara, Pancasila as…, 78.
28
Prawiranegara, Pancasila as…, 76.
29
Prawiranegara, Pancasila as…,78.
30
Yance Arizona, “The Return of Pancasila: Political and Legal Rhetoric against Transnational Islamist
Imposition,” Constitutional Review 5, no. 1 (May 2019): 166
31
Law Number 12 of 2011 regarding Legislation Making, Art 2.
32
Law Number 12 of 2011, Elucidation of Art 2.
25
26
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consequences pertaining to its ideological feature. First, the activities of a societal
organization must contribute to the development of Indonesia in conformity with the
objectives as summarized within Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and second, a
societal organization is prohibited to adopt, develop, and spread the teaching or idea
which contradicts Pancasila.33

The latter consequence lies at the heart of the ideological curtailment on a societal
organization in Indonesia. In defining the teaching or idea which is deemed to be in
contradiction to Pancasila, the elucidation of SOL conjures two definite classifications
of ideas, which are “Atheism,” and “Communism/ Marxism-Leninism,” as well as
one non-exhaustive idea, which is “other idea with the intent of replacing/altering
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.”

III. Indonesia’s Ideological Limitation as a Legitimate Intrusion on
Freedom of Expression within the Sphere of the ICCPR Regime
The ideological framework that Indonesia ascribes to a societal organization is
indubitably restraining. As elaborated above, a societal organization is deterred to
adopt, develop, and spread ideologies in contradiction to Pancasila.34 From a domestic
legal perspective, such limitation is warranted in light of Article 28J(2) of the 1945
Constitution which stipulates “In the exercise of his/her rights and freedom, every
person shall abide by the limitations to be stipulated by the laws with the purpose of
solely guaranteeing the recognition as well as respect for the rights and freedoms of the
others and in order to comply with just demands in accordance with considerations for
morality, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society.” However,
in the international law context, such a limitation also coincides with the nature of
several rights accorded within the ICCPR, which binds Indonesia under state party
obligation.35 Such as freedom of association, freedom of expression, as well as freedom
of thought and conscience.36

For the purpose of this Paper, however, aspects relating to the freedom of
expression are favored to be applied as the qualifying threshold to test the legitimacy
of Indonesia’s ideological curtailment in two aspects. First, due to its exceptional and
central role as the enabler of human rights mechanisms and democracy. Freedom
of expression can be designated as a meta right for the overarching functioning of
the human rights mechanism as it enables the enjoyment of myriad other rights,
including the right to assembly and association, political participation, and cultural
rights.37 The United Nations Human Rights Committee even deems such freedom
reigns paramount importance in any democratic society.38 Second, the formulation
of Indonesia’s ideological curtailment necessitates a specific manifestation of action
by virtue of the spreading of certain teaching or ideology to the public, making the
curtailment to be within the scope of forum externum in nature which relates more

SOL, Art 1 and Art 59(4)c.
SOL, Art 59(4)c.
35
See Law Number 12 of 2005 regarding the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
36
See ICCPR, Art 18; Art 19, and Art 22.
37
Michael O’Flaherty, “Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34,” Human Rights Law Review
12, no. 4 (2012): 631.
38
UN Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995, Tae-Hoon Park v. the Republic of Korea, Communication no.
628/1995 (20 October 1998): para. 10.3.
33
34
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aptly with freedom of expression, as opposed to forum internum rights such as
freedom of thought and conscience.39

In grasping the extent of the freedom of expression, this Paper is not in the position
to deny that Indonesia’s regulatory framework pertaining to the ideological limitation
on a societal organization is indeed restrictive in its nature, rather, it argues that as
restrictive as it may be, such ideological curtailment is legitimate in the eye of the
ICCPR regime, as it complies with the cumulative thresholds governed by the ICCPR
to limit freedom of expression, namely, prescribed by law, serving one of the aims
enumerated in Article 19, paragraph 3 (a) and (b) of the ICCPR, and is necessary to
achieve one of these purposes.40

A. Prescribed by Law

The first element that the state must comply with in limiting freedom of expression
is the procedural avenue of its restriction, as it must be in the form of a law.41 In
determining whether a law is legitimate within the scope of the ICCPR regime, General
Comment Number 34 of the ICCPR sets out several benchmarks to be adhered to by
the state which deal with aspects relating to the product of the law, its characteristics,
its accessibility, and also its punitive mechanism.42

First, regarding the product of the law. The ICCPR regime instructs that the law
must not manifest as a traditional, religious, or customary law.43 Conversely, it must
be in the form of a written legal product to ensure compliance with the legality
principle. In line with such requirements, SOL is indeed a written legal product as
it is in the form of Undang-Undang, one of the recognized legal products within the
hierarchy of Indonesia’s legislation.44 Second, regarding the characteristic of the law,
the ICCPR regime mandates the law to be formulated with a precision that enables
an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.45 To this end, SOL provides
further elaboration on the list of the detailed curtailed ideas which bestows a degree
of clarity for the relevant societal organization to hinder from.46 Nevertheless, one
particular idea requires a greater degree of interpretation, which will be further
elaborated infra as part of the current challenges of Indonesia’s ideological framework
on a societal organization. Third, regarding the accessibility of the law. In elucidating
this threshold, General Comment Number 34 highlights the existence of public access
to the relevant law.47 In conformity with such elements, Indonesia’s legislation process
mandates each Undang-Undang to be promulgated by its placement in the state
gazette so that every person may access such law.48 Finally, regarding the punitive
mechanism of the law, the relevant law is prohibited from incorporating corporal

39
See UN Doc. A/HRC/31/18, Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief (23
December 2015): para 7.
40
UN Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, Marques de Morais v. Angola, Communication no. 1128/2002
(29 March 2005): para 6.8. and UN Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000, Shin Hak Chul v. Republic of Korea, Communication no. 926/2000 (16 March 2004): para. 7.2.
41
UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, General Comment on Article 19 (2011): para 22.
42
Ibid, para 24-27.
43
Ibid, para 24.
44
Law Number 12 of 2011, Art 7.
45
General Comment on Article 19 (2011): para 25.
46
SOL, Elucidation of Art 59(4)c.
47
Ibid.
48
Law Number 12 of 2011, Art 81 and Art 82.
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punishment as a penalty when a violation over applicable restriction occurs, as it is
deemed to be incompatible with the ICCPR.49 To this end, corporal punishment is not
accommodated by SOL, relevant provisions within SOL which dictate sanctions cover
administrative and criminal sanctions in the form of imprisonment.50
B. Serving one of the aims enumerated in Article 19, paragraphs 3 (a) and (b)

Respectively, there are two classifications of legitimate aims that the state may
invoke in restricting the freedom of expression, namely, (a) for respect of the rights
or reputations of others; or (b) for the protection of national security or public order
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.51 Among these grounds, based on the
interpretation of past precedents by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of
Indonesia, this Article will seek to establish the existence of national security, and
public order as conceivable purposes for the construction and implementation of SOL.

First, is the existence of national security. From an international law standpoint,
finding an umbrella doctrine to define a universally accepted understanding of
national security is proven to be a challenge.52 This partially is attributed to the nature
of national security which is often deemed to be a dynamic and ever-evolving concept,
thus making it too difficult to be demarcated.53 Several findings, however, can shed
light to better comprehend this concept within the confine of the ICCPR. Siracusa
Principles posit that national security is closely related to the protection of a state’s
existence, territorial integrity, or political independence.54

Another elaboration can also be found in Jeong-Eun Lee v. the Republic of Korea, a
case brought before the Human Rights Committee concerning the legitimacy of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea’s decision to imprison an individual who is
involved in the allegedly “enemy-benefiting group” and anti-state organization.55 In
such a case, the degree of threat to national security was assessed wherein the danger
to the national security must be a real danger and not a hypothetical one in order to
warrant the legitimate restriction.56 In another instance, Human Rights Committee
in V. M. R. B. v. Canada refrains itself to evaluate the substantive element of national
security that Canada invoked as a ground to deport an alien, consequently, rendering
a degree of discretion to the state in evaluating the security rating when it imposes
certain restriction.57
To this end, the ideological limitation as governed by SOL is intended to dismiss
any ideology which is aimed to replace or alter Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.58
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In order to establish the connection between SOL’s objective with a national security
concern, one may refer to the precedent of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court in
interpreting SOL, wherein it postulates that both Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of
the Republic of Indonesia carry numerous pertinent purposes for Indonesia as a state,
inter alia, historical facts of its declaration of independence, its form and structure as
a nation and government, as well as its objective.59 Thus, replacing the two with other
ideas or teaching equally means to dismiss Indonesia of its existential foundation
as a nation-state.60 Such rationale consequently, correlates with the protection of
a state’s existence within the comprehension of national security concerns. At the
implementation level, the determination of a specific societal organization that poses
a real danger and not a hypothetical one per Jeong-Eun Lee v. the Republic of Korea is
also done on an individualized basis with expositions of all relevant evidence, which
will be further elucidated in the third element as it correspondingly relates to some
facets within the necessity test.

The second is the protection of public order. Comparable with the concept
of national security, searching for a fitting definition of public order in the eye
of international law is also particularly tricky. Ghantous for instance notes that
jurisprudences from international courts like the Permanent Court of International
Justice and ICJ did not offer a precise understanding of public order.61 Alternatively,
referring to scholars’ opinion, within the grasp of the ICCPR, public order is rooted in
the French legal system, ordre public, which comprises all mandatory rules that are
linked to the general organization of the state, or set of mandatory norms organizing
life in society within a given state which is instrumental to the survival of the state.62
Siracusa Principles further submits that public order may be understood as the sum
of rules which ensure the functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles
on which society is founded.63
In this regard, the ideological limitation within SOL prohibits societal organizations
to adopt, develop, and spread the teaching or idea which contradicts Pancasila.64
Assessing this particular proscription from Indonesia’s public order perspective, one
may construe that the purpose of this restriction is to deter potential clash within
society provided that an expression over an idea that contradicts Pancasila is being
promoted and spread in general public space. This line of reasoning can be inferred
from the precedent of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court when it examines the legality of
Indonesia’s blasphemy law where the Court also addresses the issue of atheism as an
ideology.65 In its judgment, the Court recognizes that one of the principles of Pancasila,
“belief in god” which serves as the fundamental tenet of Indonesia’s identity and status
as a state is deeply rooted within Indonesia’s society as part of their religious aspect
of life.66 Going further, the Court dismisses atheism as an ideology as it is deemed
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to be incompatible with said principle.67 To this end, the Court determines that to a
certain extent, the law governing the expression of certain interpretations of religion
is necessary in order to prevent horizontal conflict and distress in society.68 The Court
then concluded that while the state is in no position to assess the substantive element
of such interpretation, it still is required to govern the conduct of its people so that
public order can be maintained.69
C. Necessity Test

The third element that the state must satisfy in justifying its restriction on the
freedom of expression is the necessity test. To this end, the state is required to prove
that the restriction it imposes is necessary for a legitimate purpose as previously
elaborated in the second element.70 Furthermore, the justification for the measure
taken by the state in restricting freedom must also be done in an individualized
fashion.71 Subsequently, to establish the element of necessity, the state is required
to indicate a causal link between the targeted expression with the purpose of its
restriction.72

First, scrutinizing both the legal construction of SOL as well as its implementation
with regards to Article 59(4) letter c, the restriction is necessary as it is intended
to dismiss any ideology which is aimed to replace or alter Pancasila and the 1945
Constitution which as has been explained previously relates closely with two main
rationales, national security by dismantling the threat over Indonesia’s existential
foundation and public order by preventing potential societal conflict given principles
within Pancasila are the reflection of the collective identity of Indonesians.73

Second, the implementation of the restriction is also done in an individualized
fashion and with a specific observation of the causal link between the expressed
act with the provision relating to the ideological curtailment. An instance of such
implementation is apparent in the Government of Indonesia’s action toward Hizbut
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HTI itself is a part of the global Hizbut Tahrir movement and
ideology which essentially opposes the notion of democracy and nation-state.74 It
advocates for the establishment of a transnational Islamic caliphate.75 In revoking
HTI’s validation as a legal entity, the government through the Ministry of Law and
Human Rights when issuing Decision Letter AHU-30.AH.01.08 stipulated all the
specific exhibits where HTI was deemed to have violated SOL, wherein the process
also underwent layered scrutiny within the judicial branch, from the Administrative
Court level to the Supreme Court, all of which upheld the government’s decision,
including within its substantial element regarding the ideological contradiction that
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HTI conveyed through its activities with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.76

Necessity also has a close nexus with the element of proportionality.77 In this regard,
a state must demonstrate that the restriction it imposes must be proportional to the
value that the restriction serves to protect.78 To this end, the degree of severity of the
sanctions imposed may be used as one of the thresholds to measure proportionality.79
Concurrently, the construction of sanctions that the government may impose when a
violation of Article 59(4) letter c of SOL occurs exhibits a degree of proportionality
as there exist layers within the administrative sanctions that need to be rendered
first prior to the issuance of the most severe restriction measure.80 Following the
issuance of a sanction, the relevant societal organization may also file a complaint and
seek remedy on the legality of the measure that the government had taken through
administrative court.81

IV. Indonesia’s Ideological Limitation through the Lens of Doctrines and Precedents Beyond Southeast Asia Jurisdiction

Beyond the thresholds set out by the ICCPR in limiting the freedom of expression
as previously elaborated, interpretation over jurisprudences from various states also
manifests as an alternative justification for the restraint of certain ideologies, hence
the freedom of expression. As indicated in the introduction, this chapter will focus its
finding on precedents in jurisdictions beyond Southeast Asia to demonstrate that the
exercise to restrict freedom of expression due to ideological concern is not an isolated
practice.
A. The margin of Appreciation Doctrine

The basic premise of the margin of appreciation doctrine refers to a certain
discretion given by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to the European
states to reason their measure when interference or limitation over certain human
rights are conducted.82 Observing through the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the
margin of appreciation doctrine has served as the central conceptual doctrine in
the institutional and jurisprudential architecture of European states in interpreting
the scope of obligations under all the substantive articles within the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).83 Although provisions enumerated within the
ECHR are not binding to Indonesia, given the analogous nature of the substantive
formulation of Article 10 of the ECHR with Article 19 of the ICCPR, jurisprudences
of the ECtHR thus may serve as a tool to assist the interpretation of the provision
related to the freedom of expression.84 To further understand this doctrine, one needs
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to first observe Handyside v. The United Kingdom, a case brought before the ECtHR
concerning the confiscation of obscene material possessed and dispersed to the
public by Richard Handyside.85 In such a case, the Court stipulates that in measuring
the necessity when certain restriction over freedom of expression is invoked, pressing
social need serves as a benchmark.86 Further, in determining the presence of such a
need, the state is bestowed with a degree of margin of appreciation.87 This doctrine
is implemented both by the prescription of the law by national authorities and by
European supervision from the ECtHR.88
Within the ECHR regime, the margin of appreciation is applied to appraise several
legitimate aims to restrict human rights, including national security and prevention of
disorder or crime, which also coincide with rationales enumerated in the precedents
of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court as explained in the previous chapter. In the national
security context, the Court dictates that the breadth of margin of appreciation for the
state is a wide one.89 The state is also considered to be better positioned than the
Court in the assessment of related policy.90 This however does not necessarily mean
the Court renders the state with absolute discretion in interpreting national security.91
Several rulings by the Court provide instances of legitimate national security concern
warranting the curtailment over certain rights, including freedom of expression,
on the basis of inter alia threat to territorial integrity with specific incitement of
violence,92 fight against terrorism,93 and protection of state secrets.94 While in the
prevention of disorder and crime context, the ECtHR recognizes a religious aspect
of the society is among the basis to restrict offensive freedom of expression which
potentially could induce unwarranted and offensive manner from the society.95 In
such a context, societal construct, as well as the interpretation of the offensive nature
of the expression towards religious life of the society, fall within the confine of the
state’s margin of appreciation.96
Mirroring the margin of appreciation doctrine, as elaborated in the previous
chapter, the approach that Indonesia takes in rationalizing its curtailment over a
societal organization is parallel to a display of a degree of state’s discretion per
the doctrine’s understanding. Such exercise of discretion is also valid per several
comparable rationales with the ECHR regime in interpreting the margin of appreciation
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doctrine, such as national security and public order as it is intended to maintain
Indonesia’s existence as a state and to prevent distress and clash within the society.97
It is noteworthy however that, unlike the European regime, there is neither a binding
regional human rights convention nor a regional court in Southeast Asia to oversee
the exercise of this margin of appreciation doctrine as reflected in Handyside v. The
United Kingdom.98 To this end, one may still construe the resemblance over the crux
of substantive aspect of judicial oversight towards executive action pertaining to the
exercise of this doctrine. In such a case, the oversight subsists as it rests in Indonesia’s
judicial mechanism within the State Administrative Court and the Supreme Court for
the challenge over the legitimacy of the government’s decision in restricting certain
societal organizations, and the Constitutional Court for the judicial review of the
substantive element within SOL.99
B. Safeguarding Democratic Values

Dispersed in numerous national legal traditions and jurisdictions, the defense
of democratic values serves as one of the recognized defenses for states to restrict
certain human rights. Canada for instance allows a limitation of certain rights so long
as its justification is within the confine of a “free and democratic society.”100 South
Africa subscribes to the concept of “open and democratic society” as conditio sine qua
non to measure the legality of a limitation of human rights.101 Germany utilizes the
term “free democratic basic order” as one of the benchmarks in applying restrictions
over certain rights.102 While South Korea invokes the term “fundamental democratic
order” to govern its political landscape.103

The scope of such limitation as exercised for the protection of these democratic
values also extends into the freedom of expression as part of human rights. In R v.
Keegstra, a case concerning the prosecution of James Keegstra, a high school teacher
who made an antisemitic remark to his students, the Supreme Court of Canada notes
that although freedom of expression poses a significant value to Canadian society,104
it, however, may still be infringed subject to a countervailing state interest of the
most compelling nature.105 In another instance, assessing the legality of an Act which
criminalizes incitement in Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v. Minister of Justice
and Correctional Services and Another, the Supreme Court of South Africa postulates
that reasonable proscription to activities and expression is permitted should they
pose a threat to constitutional values and order which serve as the basis for open and
democratic societies.106
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Observing the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany’s precedents, Weiss
concludes that the freedom of expression is not absolute and may be limited by general
laws under the Civil Code or balanced in light of all of the circumstances against other
fundamental rights protected by the Basic Law.107 In a more ideological nuance, Sung
Ho Kim theorizes that to a certain extent the nature of South Korea’s Constitution
is indivisible with its historical context in opposing communism as an idea.108 Kim
further notes that the explication of this ideological identity channels itself into a
more specific area of domestic law through the adoption of South Korea’s National
Security Law.109 As maintained by South Korea’s Supreme Court and Constitutional
Court, National Security Law serves as one of the legal grounds to curb freedom of
expression for which national security concern is in jeopardy.110

Navigating through those legal instruments and case laws, one may substantiate
that the practice to curtail freedom of expression to safeguard democratic values
persists both beyond the ICCPR paradigm and legal framework in Southeast Asian
states. Such practice is intermittently even intended to banish the spread of certain
ideology which is considered to be in contradiction with the fabric of democratic values.
In South Korea’s context, Kwang-Yeong Shin notes that the application of South Korea’s
National Security Law has been characteristically noticeable to deter communism as
an ideology since 1948.111 While in Germany, the design of the Basic Law is framed
with the intention to diminish the tenets of Nazism as an ideology.112 Correspondingly,
this Paper submits that the legal construction of SOL which in essence is designed to
deter any teaching or idea to replace Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution could also
be regarded as a means to uphold democratic values. Scrutinizing the constitutional
structure of the human rights framework in Indonesia, relevant provision mandates
the principle of a democratic state based on the law to be the overarching notion
in governing the enforcement and protection of human rights.113 Subsequently,
legitimate limitations over certain rights, including the freedom of expression must
be justified within the comprehension of a democratic society.114

V. Indonesia’s Ideological Curtailment: Challenges and Opportunities

Even if, as substantiated in the previous chapter, several conceivable justifications
from an international law perspective for the ideological curtailment in Indonesia
could be accepted, several challenges remain looming given the existing construction
and implementation of SOL. These challenges, at the bare minimum, resonate with
two alarming concerns, namely, the expansive characteristic of Indonesia’s ideological
curtailment on societal organization and the absence of an external judicial mechanism
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First, is the relatively expansive nature of Indonesia’s ideological curtailment.
Within the elucidation of the relevant article in SOL, there are three classifications of
ideas that are being curtailed to a societal organization, which consist of “Atheism”,
“Communism/ Marxism-Leninism”, and “other ideas with the intent of replacing/
altering Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution”.115 Dissecting further the character of the
aforementioned ideas, one can find that their nature is not always equivalent in their
construction. Two types of ideas arguably afford a greater precision to be defined
than the other, namely Atheism, and Communism/ Marxism-Leninism. The latter even
could be traced in Indonesia’s historical context.116 Therefore is sequential in nature
and may be identified as a memory law.117 However, the third classification, “other
idea with the intent of replacing/altering Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution”, may
pose a distinctive challenge in the implementation sequence as it does not necessarily
deal with a memory law nor is strictly classified into a certain school of thoughts,
rather it is established itself as a non-exhaustive element where a degree of a more
advanced interpretation is detrimental.

Second, is the absence of an external judicial mechanism for the implementation of
ideological curtailment. Unlike several other regions which are equipped with regional
human rights courts with the power to supervise and control the implementation
of regional human rights conventions including the extent of the assessment of the
legality of national executive action, Southeast Asia, as of this moment does not have
an analogous mechanism.118 Furthermore, currently, Indonesia is also not a party to
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.119 Thus, at the very least, the quasi-judicial
supervision from Human Rights Committee for individual complaints procedure
is also absent. This absence of an external judicial mechanism conversely puts the
gravity of the supervision of decisions taken by Indonesia’s government pertaining
to SOL solely rests within the confine of Indonesia’s national legal and institutional
framework.
Despite these challenges, with several relevant strategies, myriad opportunities lie
ahead to construct a lasting legal framework capable of tackling ideologically induced
predicament. First regarding the non-exhaustive element of the third classification
of the curtailed ideology within SOL. As previously discussed, threats to national
security or public order are incessantly developing, thus necessitating a dynamic legal
regime to overcome them. It is within the intention of the drafter of SOL to formulate
a lasting legal framework to address this everchanging landscape as the previous SOL
with a non-exhaustive list of ideas was proven to expose itself to a legal vulnerability
in keeping up with the changing ideological challenge.120 On one hand, this provision
may be considered to be a potentially overboard formulation, however, on the other
hand, this is precisely where the opportunity rests, and will sequentially correspond
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Roscoe Pound once conspicuously posited that “the definition of law has been
the battle ground of jurisprudence.”121 To this end, through their jurisprudences,
Indonesia’s judicial branch collectively is in the utmost pertinent juncture to define
and safeguard the implementation phase of SOL. Shiv Bedi in noting the role of judges,
both in the national and international context, opines that during their engagement
in the judicial process, judges develop and create law from within the existing law.122
In this regard, Bedi highlights the extent the judicial branch may undergo in clarifying
the law. Similarly in Indonesia’s context, judges are also in the best position to develop
a lasting qualifying legal test to strike the balance between the restriction imposed to
overcome ideological challenges and the guarantee of the continuation of democratic
values as enumerated within Indonesia’s Constitution. To do so, although foreign
to be unswervingly applied in civil law tradition, the judicial philosophy enshrined
within the maxim, “stare decisis et non quieta movere,” or as the late Henry Campbell
Black put it, “to abide by the precedents and not to disturb settled points,” may bequeath
several compelling advantages.123

The discipline of strictly and consistently holding past established decisions will
bestow society with better legal certainty.124 In this regard, should the formulation
to determine legitimate restriction within SOL by Indonesia’s judicial branch be
consistently upheld between one judgment to another, between one chamber of
the court to another, the society will indubitably be better served as the direction to
erroneously interpret SOL could be immensely descended? Further, the Stare Decisis
principle is predicated on the search for applicable doctrine through the process of
reasoning, illustrations, arguments, analogies, or references between relevant facts of
one case to another.125 It drives the court to be thorough and precise in interpreting
and expounding the law. Through this process, as more cases are analyzed by the
court and steadily upheld, the more norms that can be deduced in elaborating the
curtailment as stipulated in SOL, thus making it easier for society to comprehend
the implementation models of SOL through these consistent precedents. Invariably,
in advancing the quality of its judgment, Indonesia’s judicial arm should also be
extensive and refuse to restrain itself in the quest to invent the ideal qualifying test
for the implementation of SOL by exploring norms enshrined within jurisprudences
of other advanced legal traditions. In R v. Keegstra for instance, the Supreme Court of
Canada avails itself with the opportunity to comparatively examine the benchmark in
restricting certain rights through the precedent of the Supreme Court of the United
States.126

Second, the reliance on Indonesia’s national legal and institutional system should
not constantly be construed as a quandary. As the notion of legal pluralism dictates,
even amid the crippling grip of international order, there are fragments of law, given
their characteristics, that will be better left within the auspice of the domestic legal
realm. Similarly, as has been discoursed before, aspects relating to ideology, the extent
of national security, and public order warrant a degree of discretion within the ambit
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of the state’s domestic legal framework. What is pivotal then is to ensure the good
working of a national legal and institutional system so that SOL could be reasonably
executed. As the previous point has established, the judicial branch is immensely
instrumental to develop a qualifying test that is cogent, consistent, and precise. To
sustain this strategy, the judicial branch would require the participation of society
as the trigger to activate its scrutiny both on the implementation of SOL and the
constitutionality of SOL. From a public advocacy standpoint, incumbent upon such
a process is the opportunity for the society to construct a well-thought element to
elucidate SOL under their argument before the court. This line of reasoning follows
the premise that Pound once described where through judicial experience and actual
cases, elements within the society may infuse order of ideas which the courts may use
and consequently develop into a modern system,127

VI. Conclusion

At the outset, it is palpable that the state’s ideological subscription, as in the case of
Nicaragua, rests within the sphere of the state’s sovereignty. However, when it comes
to the implementing avenue of such an ideology within a national legal framework,
inter alia curtailment measure dedicated to upholding such an ideology, the state is
not necessarily immune from further scrutiny, particularly as it may correspond to
the protection of certain rights within the corpus of human rights regime. To this end,
in an effort to embolden, or rather, defend Pancasila as its state ideology, Indonesia
inflicts a degree of ideological curtailment on all societal organizations existing under
its jurisdiction wherein they are barred to adopt, develop, and spread the teaching or
idea which contradicts Pancasila.128
Such curtailment in essence warrants further justification from an international
law standpoint as it intersects with the protection of certain rights, in particular
freedom of expression. Complementing the government’s views which gravitate
on the invocation of Article 4(1) of the ICCPR and the 1993 Bangkok Declaration of
Human Rights, this Article offers an alternative defense. To validate the ideological
curtailment levied on societal organizations, this Article attempts to establish that
SOL as the regulatory framework for such curtailment has met the thresholds to limit
the freedom of expression as governed under Article 19 of the ICCPR, which comprises
three main elements: prescribed by law, serving one of the aims enumerated in Article
19, paragraph 3 (a) and (b), and is necessary to achieve one of these purposes. In
addition, beyond said ICCPR paradigm, by steering through jurisprudences from
various jurisdictions, this Article also invokes the margin of appreciation and the
safeguarding democratic values doctrines as an alternative possible justification for
Indonesia’s ideological curtailment.
While the main objective of this Article is to reason an ideological curtailment
measure, it is not oblivious to the propensity that incumbent upon this type of
legislation is the latent harm and abuse provided that the implementation level by
the executive branch is not stringently checked and supervised. With that said, the
judicial branch is rightly positioned, not only to check the executive’s action but
also to formulate a lasting qualifying legal test to balance the interest in upholding
certain ideologies with the protection of human rights as it interprets SOL through
127
Roscoe Pound, “Social Problems and the Courts,” American Journal of Sociology 18, no. 3 (1912):
338-339.
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its judgments. In Indonesia’s setting, to do so, this Article proposes the consistent
use of the stare decisis principle and the extensive comparative analysis of other
established precedents beyond Indonesia. Inherently, the key to such an overall
process is the active participation from the society in every legal avenue pertaining
to SOL, especially those which correlate with the judicial branch as it cannot initiate
a proceeding without the submission from the relevant party, including the society.
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